Organizational boards of directors are one of the most important subgroups within most modern organizations, performing critical advisory, monitoring and resource dependence roles. This paper investigates the crucial question of whether the stock market values ethnic and gender diversity within organizational boards. We find that board diversity is positively associated with market valuation. We distinctively demonstrate further that ethnic diversity is valued more highly by the stock market than gender diversity. By contrast, we do not find any evidence of a significant non-linear link between board diversity and market valuation. Our findings are robust across a number of econometric models that deal with different types of endogeneities and market valuation measures. Overall, our results are consistent with agency and resource dependence theoretical predictions.
sample of SA listed organisations, we provide evidence on the relationship between board diversity and market value. To the best of our knowledge, this study constitutes one of the first attempts at estimating the impact of board diversity on organizational valuation within an African context, with particular focus on SA, and thus crucially extends the literature to that continent. The study also contributes to the mainly developed countries-based literature on the association between board diversity and market valuation. Second, and different from most past studies, we show how both ethnic and gender diversity affect market value, and thereby shedding new crucial insights on the link between ethnic diversity and market value. Third, we distinctively provide evidence on the relative value relevance of ethnic versus gender diversity on market valuation. Fourth, we uniquely investigate the existence of a non-monotonic association between board diversity and market valuation. Finally, and distinct from most prior studies, we apply econometric methods that sufficiently deal with different kinds of endogeneities, as well as make use of different measures of market valuation.
Our results suggest that the SA stock market values ethnic and gender diversity within organizational boards as there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between board diversity and market valuation. Distinct from prior studies, we show further that ethnic diversity is valued more highly by the SA stock market than gender diversity. This sheds new important insights on the relative value relevance of gender versus ethnic diversity on market valuation. By contrast, we do not find any evidence of a significant non-linear link between board diversity and market valuation. The central tenor of our findings remains unchanged across a number of econometric models that deal with different types of endogeneities and market valuation measures.
Overall, our findings are consistent with agency and resource dependence theories, which suggest that ethnic and gender diversity enhances board independence, executive monitoring and decision-making, as well as helps to better link an organization to its external environment that facilitates securing critical resources, and thereby improving market valuation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a brief overview of the organizational governance and statutory reforms on board diversity within the South African organizational context. The third section discusses the extant theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of board diversity on market valuation. The fourth section presents the research design.
The fifth section reports empirical analyses, whilst the final section contains concluding remarks.
Organizational Governance and Statutory Reforms on Board Diversity within the South African Organizational Context
As previously explained, and although SA is widely perceived as one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world (Armstrong et al., 2006; Andreasson, 2013) , apartheid policy of racial segregation in every reasonably conceivable aspect of life, such as education, housing, and economic participation ensured that organizational boards were dominated mainly by middle class white males (Swartz and Firer, 2005; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a) . Therefore, and following the collapse of apartheid in 1994, the ruling African National Congress initiated a number of reforms that were aimed addressing historical socio-economic inequalities between black and white South Africans (Rossouw et al., 2002; West, 2009 First, and although OG had implicitly existed in SA in the form of the 1861 Companies Act, the general view is that the introduction of the King Reports explicitly institutionalised OG 2 As an illustration (and will also be discussed further in sections 5 and 7), the Appendix contains examples of annual report disclosures of progress made by some SA companies on complying with the 1998 employment equity and 2003 black economic empowerment acts.
practices (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012) . The reports focused primarily on improving the way in which SA organizations are governed (King Committee, 2002) , coinciding with international attempts (e.g., the 1992 UK Cadbury Report) at enhancing the efficacy of OG structures around the world, as well as preceding well-publicised cases of major organizational failure mainly in a number of developed economies in the 1980s, especially in the UK and US (King Committeee, 2002) .
Noticeably, the OG proposals contained in the King Reports were largely similar to those of the UK"s Cadbury Report (Mangena & Chamisa, 2008; Andreasson, 2013) . For example, and similar to the Cadbury Report, the King Reports recommended an Anglo-American style single-tier independently chaired board of directors, consisting of executive and independent non-executive directors, supported by independent committees (e.g., audit, remuneration, and nomination), and operating within a voluntary ("comply or explain") OG compliance regime (King Committee, 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006) . With particular respect to board diversity, the King Reports did not set any specific targets for organizations to comply with. However, the Reports suggested that every organization should consider whether its board is diverse enough in terms of demographics (i.e., age, ethnicity and gender). This is expected to ensure that the composition of SA organizational boards reflect the naturally diverse SA context, as well as make them effective.
Second, and unlike the King Reports, the 1998 EE and 2003 BEE Acts focused directly on enhancing diversity within SA organizational boards (Andreasson, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a) . More specifically, the EE Act seeks to identify and eliminate all previous unfair and discriminatory employment practices on any grounds, including race and gender, requiring every organization to work towards achieving a balance between their non-white and white workforce across all levels of the organisational hierarchy. 3 Similarly, the BEE Act focuses on transforming the SA economy by de-racialising organizational ownership and management by increasing black ownership and direct participation in business. Specifically, the BEE Act proposes a number of ways by which economic transformation can be achieved, including equity ownership and management control with clear cut targets for organizations to meet. For example, and to address the low participation of blacks in executive management, the Act encourages organizations to appoint qualified blacks into senior management positions, including board memberships, with a target of 40 to 50% non-whites.
Third, and crucially, compliance with these reforms are largely voluntary. The SA organizational setting is, however, distinctively characterised by high block and institutional shareholdings, mainly in the form of complex cross-ownerships and tall pyramids (Barr et al., 1995; Ntim et al., 2012) . Also, shareholder activism is noticeably weak, whilst the ability to implement and enforce organizational laws is observably poor (Rossouw et al., 2002; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008) . Together, and given the SA organizational context, this raises critical concerns as to whether a voluntary compliance regime, as contained in the King Reports and the BEE Act, for example, will be effective in achieving meaningful diversity within SA organizational boards. Consequently, the main objective is to investigate the extent to which these regulatory, affirmative action, and OG reforms have been able to enhance diversity within the SA organizational boards, and whether the stock market values such diversity within SA organizational boards.
Board Diversity and Market Value: Theory, Evidence and Hypothesis Development
Organizational boards of directors remain one of the most crucial subgroups within the upper management of a considerable number of organizations (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; Sonnenfeld, 2002; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Bart and McQueen, 2013; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013) . As a group, organizational boards perform a number of strategic functions, including advising, monitoring, compensating and firing executives, and securing critical organizational resources (Pfeffer, 1973; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Abdullah, 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Wellage and Locke, 2013) . In fact, and as discussed, one of the most significant OG issues currently facing SA organizations is board diversity 4 and its impact on market valuation.
However, there are mixed theoretical propositions as to the impact of board diversity on shareholder value: those who argue for more diversity in boardrooms and those who are in favour of organizational monoculture and boardroom uniformity (Bilimoria and Piderit, 1994; du Plessis, 2008; Kang et al., 2007; Singh, 2007; Campbell and Minquez-Vera, 2008) . Proponents of diversity in organizational boardrooms usually base their arguments on agency, resource dependence and stakeholding theories (Goodstein et al., 1994; Burges and Tharenou, 2002; Dwyer et al., 2003; Robertson and Park, 2007; Yang and Konrad, 2011) . Firstly, agency theory suggests that boards of diverse backgrounds increases board independence and improves executive monitoring (Kesner, 1988; van der Walt and Ingley, 2003; Johnston and Malina, 2008; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Abdullah, 2013; Triana et al., 2013) , and thereby enhance market value.
Secondly, it brings diversity in ideas, perspectives, experience, and business knowledge to the decision-making process in boardrooms (Gilbert and Stead, 1999; Watson et al., 1993; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013) , which can facilitate better appreciation of the complexities of the organizational external environment. It can also increase creativity and innovation in boardrooms due to diversity in cognitive abilities, which can also facilitate effective decision-making (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Carter et al., 2003; Welbourne et al., 2007; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012; Bart and McQueen, 2013) , and impact positively on market valuation.
Thirdly, resource dependence theory indicates that board diversity can have a positive influence on market valuation by linking an organization to its external environment and secure critical resources, including skills, business contacts, prestige and legitimacy (Goodstein et al., 1994; Westphal and Bednar, 2005; Arnegger et al., 2013) . Finally, it has been suggested that (Shrader et al., 1997; Ryan & Haslam, 2007; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Wellage and Locke, 2013 ) organizational boards of qualified individuals of diverse backgrounds and constituencies can help provide a better link with an organization"s stakeholders, such as consumers and communities, which can improve its opportunities, reputation and value. Carter et al. (2003) suggest, for example, that by matching the diversity of an organization"s board to the diversity of its customers and suppliers, it can significantly increase its ability to penetrate competitive markets.
However, and relying on agency and organization theories, opponents contend that board diversity can impact negatively on market valuation. Firstly, ethnic and gender-based board members may be appointed as a sign of tokenism, and as such their contributions may be marginalised (Hillman et al., 2007; Abdullah, 2013) . Secondly, organization theory indicates that greater diversity within boards may significantly constrain its efforts to take decisive action and initiate strategic changes, especially in times of poor organizational performance and environmental turbulence (Goodstein et al., 1994; Krishman and Park, 2005) . Thirdly, diverse board members may bring their individual and constituencies" interests and commitments to the board (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Wellage and Locke, 2013) . The greater the diversity of these interests, the greater the potential for conflicts and factions to emerge among them as a group (Robertson and Park, 2007; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009) , which can inhibit boardroom cohesion and performance (Goodstein et al., 1994; Francoeur et al., 2008; Lincoln and Adedoyin, 2012). 5 Consistent with the conflicting nature of the theoretical literature on board diversity, previous evidence regarding the link between board diversity and market valuation is equally mixed (Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Shrader et al., 1997; Carter et al., 2003 Carter et al., , 2010 Ujunwa, 2012; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013) . One strand of the empirical literature reports that more diverse boards are associated with higher market valuation (Erhardt et al., 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adler, 2010) . For example, and using 25 American listed organizations, Adler (2010) finds a positive correlation between employing higher percentage of women in top management and market valuation. Carter et al. (2003) also report a positive link between board diversity and market value using a 1997 cross-sectional sample of 638 American organizations.
Consistent with prior evidence (Erhardt et al., 2003; Catalyst, 2007; Kang et al., 2007; Campbell and Minquez-Vera, 2008; Johnston and Malina, 2008; Robertson and Park, 2008) , They report positive and significant abnormal returns in organizations with a higher proportion of women officers. Further, recent evidence by Mahadeo et al. (2012) , Abdullah (2013) , Bart and McQueen (2013) , Luckerath-Rovers (2013), Triana et al. (2013) , and Wellage and Locke (2013) provide additional support for the evidence of a positive association between board diversity and market valuation in Mauritius, Malaysia, Finland, Netherlands, US, and Sri Lanka, respectively.
By contrast, but consistent with the conflicting nature of prior board diversity theory, other studies report that board diversity rather impacts negatively on market valuation (Watson et al., 1993; Shrader et al., 1997; Hillman et al., 2007; Ujunwa, 2012; Ujunwa et al., 2012; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013) . Goodstein et al. (1994) investigate the impact of board diversity on an organization"s ability to initiate strategic changes in a total of 335 American organizations from 1980 to 1985, and find that organizations with diverse boards are less likely to initiate strategic changes than those with homogenous boards. Shrader et al. (1997) With respect to SA, and as has been discussed, both the 1998 EE and 2003 BEE Acts directly seek to enhance ethnic and gender diversity within SA organizational boards. Similarly, the King Reports require organizations to regularly review ethnic and gender composition of their boards, so as to not only reflect the diverse SA context, but also enhance effective operations.
Together, these regulatory and OG reforms appear to suggest that board diversity can impact positively on market valuation. However, and given the mixed international evidence, we predict a statistically significant association between board diversity and market valuation without being specific about the direction of the sign of the coefficient. Therefore, our main hypothesis to be tested in this study is that:
There is either a statistically significant negative or positive association between board diversity on the basis of both ethnicity and gender, and market valuation.
Research Design

Sample and data
As at 31/12/2007, a total of 402 organizations from ten industries, namely: basic materials; consumer goods; consumer services; financials; health care; industrials; oil & gas; technology;
telecoms; and utilities were listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Due to capital structure and regulatory reasons, 111 financials and utilities were excluded from the sample, leaving us with 291 organizations from eight non-financial industries to be sampled. We needed data on OG and financial variables to investigate the association between board diversity and market value. The OG variables were collected from the sampled organizations" annual reports, which were downloaded from the Perfect Information Database. The financial data were collected from DataStream. The organizations in our final sample had to satisfy two criteria: the accessibility to an organization"s Our criteria were motivated by a number of reasons. First, and in line with past studies (Yermack, 1996; Carter et al., 2003) , the criteria allowed us to satisfy the requirements for a balanced panel data analysis. Some of the benefits that can be derived for using panel data include having both time-series and cross-sectional observations, more degrees of freedom and less multicollinearity among the variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010) . Second, an investigation of five-year data with both cross-sectional and time-series properties may be useful in determining whether the observed cross-sectional relationship between board diversity and market valuation holds over-time (Carter et al., 2010; Ntim et al., 2012) . This may help in drawing direct comparisons with the findings of previous studies (Rose, 2007; Francoeur et al., 2008; Robertson and Park, 2008) . Using our selection criteria, the complete data needed is obtained for a total of 169 organizations over five years and 8 industries for our empirical investigation.
Dependent, independent and control variables
In this subsection, we discuss the three main categories of variables that we use in our examination, and Table 1 contains their full definitions. First, we measure our main independent variable in four ways: board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE); board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG); board diversity on the basis of gender non-whites (i.e., black women) (BDIVGNW); and board diversity on the basis of both ethnicity and gender (BDIV). Second, the widely used Tobin"s Q (Q) is our main dependent variable/measure for market valuation. As a robustness check, however, we use return on assets (ROA) and total share return (TSR), as an alternative accounting and market-based organizational valuation measures, respectively.
Finally, and in line with past studies (Carter et al., 2003 (Carter et al., , 2010 Johnston and Malina, 2008 (Beiner et al., 2006; Ntim et al., 2012) and hence, such organizations are more likely to be highly valued by the stock market. Therefore, we conjecture that sales growth (SGR) will correlate positively to market valuation. Second, organizations that invest heavily in research and development can obtain knowledge and technological advantages over their competitors (Shrader et al., 1997; Adams and Ferreira, 2009) , and as such, may be highly valued by the stock market. By contrast, the capital intensive nature of the research and development activity (Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012) , can impact negatively on current market valuation.
Insert Table 1 about here
In a similar vein, and on the one hand, organizations that use more debt can improve their market valuation by effectively minimising the ability of opportunistic managers to extract "free cash flows" (Jensen, 1986; Guest, 2009 ). On the other hand, high levels of leverage can increase the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy by impairing the ability of organizations to fully utilise commercial opportunities (Jensen, 1986; Ntim et al., 2012) . This can impact negatively on market valuation. Also, larger organizations may have economy of scale, market power, and access to resources advantages over their smaller counterparts (Beiner et al., 2006; Robertson and Park, 2007) and therefore, may be more highly valued by the stock market. By contrast, smaller organizations tend to have higher opportunities to grow than larger ones (Pfeffer, 1973; Guest, 2009; Kang et al., 2007; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Triana et al., 2013) and hence, smaller organizations may be valued higher by the stock market than larger organizations.
Due to the conflicting theoretical expectations, we predict that leverage (LEV), capital expenditure (CAPX) and organizational size (LOGTA) will have either a negative or positive correlation with market valuation. Third, organizations that are cross-listed on foreign stock markets may be better placed to raise capital at a cheaper cost to finance growth opportunities than their non-cross-listed counterparts , and thus may be valued more highly by the stock market. Hence, we expect dual-listed organizations (DUALIST) to be positively related to market valuation. Fourth, DeAngelo (1981) suggests that audit organizational size is positively related to auditor independence and audit quality, and therefore organizations audited by large audit organizations may be more highly valued by the stock market. Thus, we predict that the size and reputation of the audit organization (BIG4) will impact positively on market valuation.
Fifth, maintaining connections with government in the form of direct government ownership can provide access to critical resources, such as finance and lucrative business contracts (Pfeffer, 1973; Yang and Konrad, 2011) . Therefore, we expect government ownership (GVOWN) to correlate positively with market valuation. Sixth, organizations that voluntarily set-up OG committee to specifically monitor OG standards may be in a better position to reduce the ability of self-serving managers to expropriate organizational resources , and as such may be more highly valued by the stock market. Thus, we expect the presence of an OG committee (OGCO) to be positively associated with market valuation. Finally, and in line with past studies (Robertson and Park, 2007; Welbourne et al., 2007; Johnston and Malina, 2008) , we expect that market valuation will differ across different industries and financial years. Therefore, we include industry ( (Brammer et al., 2007; Fraucoeur et al., 2008; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Triana et al., 2013) . Insert Table 2 about here   Table 3 reports descriptive statistics relating to the other variables used, although for purposes of completeness, the summary board diversity measures are also reported. Generally, all the values show wide variations. For instance, and consistent with the results of Beiner et al. (2006) and Guest (2009) , Q is between a minimum of 0.58 and a maximum of 3.58 with a mean of 1.52, displaying wide spread. The alternative market valuation proxies (i.e., ROA and TSR), as well as the control variables (i.e., BIG4, CAPX, DUALIST, GVOWN, LEV, LOGTA, OGCO and SGR) show wide variations, implying that our sample has been adequately chosen to achieve sufficient variation, and thus eschews any possibilities of sample selection bias.
Insert Table 3 about here We also examined linear regression assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. We investigated the multicollinearity assumption by conducting the Spearman non-parametric and Pearson parametric bivariate correlation tests among the variables. The results, which are not reported for the sake of brevity, but available upon request, suggested that no significant non-normality and multicollinearity problems were present among the variables. In addition, we examined scatter, P-P and Q-Q plots, studentised residuals, Cook"s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics of the variables, with these tests indicating no serious violation of the linear regression assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and autocorrelation, and thereby implying that it is appropriate to carry out multivariate regression analyses.
Multivariate regression analyses
Organizations tend to differ in the challenges and opportunities that they encounter over time (Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012) . This can lead to situation whereby BDIV and Q are jointly and dynamically determined by organizational-specific differences, such as organizational culture, complexity and managerial talent (Guest, 2009) , which simple OLS regressions may not be able to detect (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010) , and thereby resulting in misleading findings (Hausman, 1978; Beiner et al., 2006; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Triana et al., 2013) . As such, and given the panel nature of our data, as well as in line with past studies (Guest, 2009; Carter et al., 2010) , we carry out fixed-effects regressions so as to control for possible unobserved organization-specific heterogeneities. We start our analysis with a fixed-effects regression model specified as follows: Table 4 , and thereby providing support for H 1 , as well as the similar findings of past studies (Johnston and Malina, 2008 ; Adam and 8 However, we note that our choice is between random and fixed-effects estimation techniques. Therefore, to ensure that fixed-effects model is appropriate, we first carry out Hausman (1978) specification test by estimating both fixed and random-effects models for the BDIV proxies separately using equation (1) and comparing their respective coefficients. Under the null hypothesis of consistent random unobserved organizational-level heterogeneity (i.e., unobserved organization-specific effects or the regressions errors are uncorrelated with the independent variables), random-effects estimates will be both consistent and efficient, whilst fixed-effects coefficients will be consistent, but inefficient (Hausman, 1978; Wooldridge, 2010) . In contrast, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then the fixed-effects approach will provide both consistent and efficient estimates, whereas random-effects estimates will be both inconsistent and biased (Hausman, 1978; Gujarati, 2003) . The test consistently rejects the null hypothesis of consistent random effects for both models at the 1% level, providing further empirical support for our decision to rely primarily on fixed-effects models.
Ferreira, 2009; Adler, 2010; Bart and McQueen, 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Wellage and Locke, 2013) . Second, and whilst prior studies have examined how the presence of white women on organizational boards influence performance (Shrader et al., 1997; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Rose, 2007; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Abdullah, 2013; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013) , the effect that non-white or black women board members has on market value remains largely unexplored. Therefore, we seek to fill this gap within the literature by uniquely running BDIVGNW on Q. Statistically significant and positive effect of BDIVGNW on Q is noticeable in Model 2 of Table 4 , and thereby providing support for H 1, in addition to shedding new crucial empirical insights on the impact of BDIVGNW on market valuation.
Third, the question of whether ethnic diversity within organizational boards is valued by the stock market has also rarely been explicitly investigated in the past (Robertson and Park, 2007; Carter et al., 2003; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Abdullah, 2013; Wellage and Locke, 2013) .
Therefore, to separately examine the impact of board diversity on the basis of ethnicity on market valuation, we re-estimate equation (1) King Reports, as well as similar findings from other markets (Erhardt et al., 2003; Francoeur et al., 2008; Dobbin and Jung, 2011; Wellage and Locke, 2013) . Theoretically, our results provide support for agency (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993) and resource dependence theories (Pfeffer, 1973; Yang and Konrad, 2011; Arnegger et al., 2013) , which suggest that ethnic and gender diversity improves board independence, executive monitoring, disciplining, and decision-making, as well as helps to better link an organization to its external environment that can facilitate securing critical resources, and thereby by improving market valuation.
Fifth, our evidence so far suggests that both gender and ethnic diversity contributes to market value, but it is unclear within the empirical literature whether gender or ethnic diversity contributes more to market value. In a regression containing both BDIVG and BDIVE, we would expect the stronger contributor to market value to dominate the other. We therefore re-run equation
(1) by including both BDIVG and BDIVE to test for the relative value relevance of gender versus ethnic diversity on organizational boards. The coefficient of Q on BDIVE in Model 5 of Table 4 is positive and statistically significant, while that on BDIVG is positive, but statistically insignificant, and thereby uniquely further shedding new important empirical insights on the relative value relevance of gender and ethnic diversity within organizational boards. Although this finding may also be explained by the lower number of gender representation on SA boards compared with men from ethic backgrounds (see Tables 2 and 3 ), it appears to be consistent with the view that women's views on the board tend to be marginalised (Shrader et al., 1997; Hillman et al., 2007; Ujunwa, 2012; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; Luckerath-Rovers, 2013; Triana et al., 2013) .
Finally, and the coefficients on the control variables in Models 1 to 5 of Table 4 are generally in line with our expectations. For example and as predicted, the coefficients on CAPX, LEV and LOGTA are statistically significant and negatively related to Q, whereas BIG4, DUALIST, GVOWN, OGCO and SGR are statistically significant and positively associated with Q, in Models 1 to 5. Finally, the F-values in Models 1 to 5 of Table 4 consistently reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the main independent and the control variables are equal to zero. Consistent with the findings of previous studies (Adam and Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003 Carter et al., , 2010 , the adjusted R 2 is between 21% and 32%, implying that our fixed-effects regressions can explain significant differences in our sampled organizations" Q.
Robustness analyses
Our fixed-effects regressions so far do not take into account the presence of possible nonmonotonic associations and alternative market valuation measures, as well as other potential endogeneities. This indicates that the evidence of a significant positive effect of BDIV on Q, for instance, may be misleading. In this subsection, we investigate how robust our findings are to the existence of potential non-linear relationships, alternative market valuation proxies, and other endogeneity problems.
First, to examine whether there is a non-monotonic link between board diversity and market valuation, such that initial increases in ethnic and gender board representations lead to declines in market valuation up to a point, beyond which additional increases in diversity improve market valuation, as predicted by Robertson and Park (2007), we re-estimate equation (1) using squared board diversity (BDIV 2 ) in addition to BDIV. 9 Positive, but statistically insignificant impact of BDIV 2 on Q is discernible in Model 6 of Table 4 , and thereby indicating that our evidence of a positive impact of BDIV on Q is not sensitive to this specification.
Second and as previously noted, we investigate the robustness of our findings to two alternative market valuation measures: return on assets (ROAan accounting based measure) and total share returns (TSRa market based proxy). Models 7 and 8 of Table 4 report results obtained by making use of ROA and TSR, respectively, instead of Q. Statistically significant and positive impact of BDIV on ROA and TSR in models 7 and 8 of Table 4 , respectively, is observable, and thereby implying that our results are fairly robust to the use of either an accounting (ROA) or a market (TSR) based market valuation measure, instead of Q.
Third, to account for potential additional endogeneity problems that may be caused by omitted variable bias, we apply the widely used two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique (Beiner et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2003 Carter et al., , 2010 . However, to make sure that the 2SLS research design is appropriate, and in line with Beiner et al. (2006) , we first carry out Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test (see Beiner et al., 2006, p. 267) to determine whether BDIV is endogenously associated with Q. Applied to equation (1), the test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity, and therefore we conclude that the 2SLS technique may be appropriate and that our earlier results based on the fixed-effects regressions may be misleading. In the first stage, we conjecture that BDIV will be determined by all the control (exogenous) variables specified in equation (1). In the second stage, we utilise the predicted portion of the BDIV (PRE_BDIV) as an instrument for the BDIV and reestimate equation (1) as specified below:
whereby everything remains unchanged as specified in equation (1) 10 except that we use the predicted BDIV (PRE_BDIV) from the first-stage regression as an instrument for the BDIV.
Statistically significant and positive effect of the PRE_BDIV on Q is noticeably in Model 9 of Table   4 , and thereby indicating that our evidence of a positive effect of BDIV on Q is not sensitive to endogeneity problems that may be caused by potential omitted variables. Overall, the robustness analyses indicate that our results are fairly robust to potential endogeneity problems, non-linear associations, and alternative market valuation proxies. Second, we find a statistically significant and positive relationship between board diversity and market valuation, implying that the SA stock market values ethnic and gender diversity within organizational boards. Third and distinct from prior studies, we show further that ethnic diversity is valued more highly by the SA stock market than gender diversity. This sheds new crucial insights on the relative value relevance of gender versus ethnic diversity on market valuation. Fourth and by contrast, we do not find any evidence of a significant non-linear link between board diversity and market valuation. Our findings are consistent across a raft of econometric models that take into consideration different types of endogeneity problems and market valuation measures.
Overall, our results provide support for agency and resource dependence theories, which suggest that ethnic and gender diversity improves board independence, executive monitoring and decision-making, as well as helps to better link an organization to its external environment that can facilitate securing critical resources, and thereby enhancing market valuation. Resource dependence may be particularly powerful in explaining our evidence of a positive effect of board diversity on market value in SA. This is because securing and renewing profitable government contracts and mining licenses in SA are usually linked to complying with affirmative action policies, such as those contained in the 1998 EE and 2003 BEE acts (Rossouw et al., 2012; West, 2009; Andreasson, 2013; Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013a) . This means that by appointing more board members from diverse ethnic and gender backgrounds, SA organizations may be inherently complying with the EE and BEE acts. As the EE and BEE acts are backed by the government, this may be a major way by which SA organizations can win government support and gain access to critical resources, such as government contracts and contacts, finance, and tax concessions that can facilitate growth and improve long-term financial performance.
Our evidence also has important implications for governments, policy-makers, and regulatory authorities. Whereas our evidence of a positive effect of board diversity on market valuation provides support for the recommendations of the EE and BEE Acts, as well as those of the King Reports, the relatively low levels of ethnic and gender diversity within SA organizational boards appear to suggest that there is the need to strengthen enforcement and compliance with the provisions of the reforms. In this case, setting up a "compliance and enforcement committee" to regularly check the levels of compliance among listed organizations may help in improving board diversity specifically, but OG standards more generally. Our SA findings will also have particular implications for countries that are currently and/or contemplating pursuing board diversity reforms.
Specifically, our findings will be of specific interests and added impetus to regulators, policymakers and governments in Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, India, Malaysia, Norway, Mozambique, New Zealand, and the USA, amongst others, where different variants of affirmative action policies are being pursed with the aim of improving racial, ethnic minority and/or gender representation in top corporate management. The ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.
ROA
The percentage of operating profit to total assets.
TSR
The percentage of annualised total share returns made up of share price and dividends.
Organizational governance/independent variables BDIV
The percentage of non-whites (i.e., of Black African, Indian, Chinese and Mixed Race backgrounds) and females (i.e., women) to the total number of directors on an organizational board.
BDIVE
The percentage of non-whites (i.e., of Black African, Indian, Chinese and Mixed Race backgrounds) to the total number of directors on an organizational board.
BDIVG
The percentage of females (i.e., women) to the total number of directors on an organizational board. BDIVGNW The percentage of non-white females (i.e., black women) to the total number of directors on an organizational board.
BSIZE
The total number of directors on the board of an organization.
Control variables BIG4
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if an organization is audited by a big four audit organization (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.
CAPX
The percentage of total capital expenditure to total assets. DUALIST A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if an organization is cross-listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.
GVOWN
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership is at least 5%, 0 otherwise.
LEV
The percentage of total debts to market value of equity.
LOGTA
The natural log of total assets. OGCO A dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if an organization has set up an organizational governance committee, 0 otherwise.
SGR
The percentage of the current year"s sales minus last year"s sales to last year"s sales.
IND
Industry dummies for the five main remaining industries.
YED
Year dummies from 2003 to 2007 inclusive. Table 3 , the average board size of our sample is 9.75 or approximately 10 directors, ranging from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 18. Notes: Variables are defined as follows: Tobin"s Q (Q), measured as the ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets. Return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of operating profit to total assets. Total shareholder returns (TSR), calculated as annualised total share returns made up of share price and dividends. Board diversity (BDIV), estimated as the percentage of non-whites (i.e., of Black African, Indian, Chinese and Mixed Race backgrounds) and females (i.e., women) to the total number of directors on an organizational board. Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE), estimated as the percentage of non-whites (i.e., of Black African, Indian, Chinese and Mixed Race backgrounds) to the total number of directors on an organizational board. Board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG), measured as the percentage of females (i.e., women) to the total number of directors on an organizational board. Board diversity on the basis of gender non-whites (BDIVGNW), estimated as the percentage of non-white females (i.e., black women) to the total number of directors on an organizational board. Board size (BSZIE), which refers to the total number of directors on the board of an organization, is reported for comparison purposes only. Audit organization size (BIG4), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if an organization is audited by a big four audit organization (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise. Capital expenditure (CAPX), calculated as the ratio of total capital expenditure to total assets. The presence of an organizational governance committee (OGCO), defined as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if a firm has set up an organizational governance committee, 0 otherwise. Dual-listing (DUALIST), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if an organization is cross-listed to a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise. Government ownership (GVOWN), measured as a dummy variable that takes the value of 1, if government ownership is at least 5%, 0 otherwise. Leverage (LEV), calculated as the ratio of total debts to market value of equity. Organizational size (LOGTA), measured as the natural log of total assets. Sales growth (SGR), calculated as the current year"s sales minus last year"s sales to last year"s sales. 0.118 (0.054) * -0.038 (0.000) *** 0.094 (0.065) * 0.749 (0.000) *** -0.428 (0.000) *** -0.560 (0.000) *** 0.454 (0.000) *** 0.385 (0.000) *** Included Included 0.216 (0.000) *** -0.029 (0.000) *** 0.250 (0.000) *** 0.862 (0.000) *** -0.475 (0.000) *** -0.614 (0.000) *** 0.476 (0.000) *** 0.402 (0.000) *** Included Included 0.205 (0.000) *** -0.032 (0.000) *** 0.314 (0.000) *** 0.292 (0.000) *** -0.036 (0.000) *** -0.318 (0.000) *** 0.260 (0.000) *** 0.135 (0.020) ** Included Included Notes: P-values are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Following Petersen (2009) , coefficients are estimated by using the robust clustered standard errors technique along both industry and year dimensions. Variables are defined as follows: Tobin"s (Q), return on assets (ROA), total share return (TSR), board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE), board diversity on the basis of gender , including (BDIVG) and excluding (BDIVGNW) whites, board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and gender (BDIV)/squared (BDIV 2 ), predicted BDIV (PRE_BDIV)obtained by regressing BDIV on the control variables and used as an instrument for BDIV in model 9, audit organization size (BIG4), capital expenditure (CAPX), dual-listing (DUALIST), government ownership (GVOWN), leverage (LEV), organizational size (LOGTA), the presence of an organizational governance committee (OGCO), sales growth (SGR), industry dummies (IND), and year dummies (YED). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used.
